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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a workbook of the game theory topics 
covered in the course SO4410 Models of Conflict. The thesis also provides a software 
toolkit, which enables students to solve the problems easier and faster, therefore focusing 
more on analyses of the situation than on the actual mathematical side of the problem.  
The workbook gives a basic review of the fundamental concepts and a detailed 
explanation for solving ‘simple’ game theory problems by pen and paper. Topics cover 
two and three person games. Two person games include (1) zero-sum games and their 
solutions in the pure or mixed strategy, (2) partial-sum games without communication 
between the players, and (3) communication among players and its effect on the game. 
Three person games focus on likely coalitions among the players. 
The toolkit covers two person zero-sum games, the Nash arbitration scheme, 
strategic moves, prudential and equalizing strategies in partial-sum games, 3-person 
games, and a supplemental template for linear programming problems with up to 10 
variables and 30 constraints. 
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In mathematics, you don't understand things. You just get used to them.  
– Johann von Neumann  
 
Conflict is as ancient as humankind, and the extreme end of conflict is war. 
Military professionals spend a great deal of time studying the nature of conflict, and for 
that reason, defense analysis students study modeling course sequences that allow them 
to use mathematical tools in social settings. 
Not everyone has a mathematical background; therefore, some concepts used in 
the sequences are difficult for students to comprehend. In particular, the SO4410 – 
Models of Conflict, which focuses mainly on the basics of game theory, can be difficult to 
understand. 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a workbook of the game theory topics, 
which are covered in the course, and to introduce the concepts intuitively. The thesis is 
not a substitute for the books and articles assigned in SO4410 but rather a facilitating 
supplement with explanatory illustrations and computational processes. The Toolkit not 
only gives the solutions but also adds graphical representation for better comprehension.  
Models of conflict assume rational decision makers, trying to maximize decision 
makers’ payoffs. In game theory, the term rationality has a different meaning than most 
people think. Rationality does not mean what we think is best or wise; to be rational, 
actors have to be able (1) to define their objectives, however foolish they appear to 
others, (2) to formulate sufficiently different alternative strategies, and (3) to choose a 
strategy that maximizes their objective. 
So the question then becomes: “What should / will the rational value maximizing 
player do?” 
 2
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II. ZERO-SUM GAMES 
Zero-sum games entail games where one player wins and the other player loses. 
There is no room for cooperation and the interests are in total conflict. Each player has a 
certain set of strategies from which he can choose, and he is unaware of the choices of the 
other player. The resulting payoff is then determined by the combination of strategies. 
Since one player wins or the other player loses, we can limit the analysis to the payoffs of 
one player.  
The zero-sum game, where (1) Player 1 (let’s call her Rose / Row player) can play 
strategies A and B, and (2) Player 2 (let’s call him Colin / Column player) can play 
strategies C and D, can be described as: 
                        Colin
                   C        D
A AC AD
Rose     
B BC BD
with the real numbers:
                       Colin
                       C     D
A 4 1
Rose           
B 2 3
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
The values in the example are the payoffs for Rose. The negatives are the payoffs 
for Colin. When Rose chooses strategy A, and Colin chooses strategy C, the outcome 
would be 4. 
Hungarian-American mathematician John von Neumann proved that all finite 
two-person zero-sum games have a solution in either pure or mixed strategies. These 
strategies give us an expected value of the game. This idea is described in the MiniMax 
Theorem and serves as a basis for the solution of zero-sum games. 
MiniMax Theorem (Rose – maximizing, Colin – minimizing) – for every finite 
two person zero-sum game there is a solution, (1) and there exists a number V called the 
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value of the game. (2)Rose has a strategy combination such that her average payoff is at 
least V no matter what Colin does, and (3) Colin has a strategy combination such that his 
average payoff is no more than V, without regard to Rose’s choices. 
In real life, the closest we can get to a total conflict is sports or games. And of 
course, war is the ultimate total conflict endeavor. Therefore, we start here. 
Two commanders are facing each other on the battlefield. Rose wants to breach 
the enemy lines. She has two options. Rose can either attack Colin at the city or through 
the adjacent mountains. Colin, on the other hand, faces the question of where to prepare 
the defense. 
Payoffs of Rose’s forces1: 
                                 Colin




⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
What can we say about this game?  Clearly, the game is in Rose’s favor. There are 
no negative numbers, so Rose can never lose. However, what else? What should a 
rational player do?  Is there an optimal way of playing such a game? 
A. MIXED AND PURE STRATEGIES – DISTINCTION 
In the game, players can either play only one of their available strategies or they 
can play some mixture of strategies. If the players’ optimal strategy is to play only one 
strategy, this is called Pure strategy solution or solution in the Pure strategies. If the 
players’ optimal strategy is a combination of the strategies with certain relative 
frequency, this is called Mixed strategy solution or solution in the Mixed strategy. 
The distinction is for convenience, and it helps one solve some games more 
quickly. Of course, the pure strategy is the mixed strategy where one of the strategies has 
the probability of playing 100 percent. 
                                                 
1 Payoffs are arbitrary. 
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It is important also to note that in the pure strategy solution one can be assured of 
winning at least the smallest amount in the strategy. However, in the mixed strategy one 
can only be assured that, over the long haul, the average payoff will be of a certain value. 
In the short term, it does not have to apply, and one must be careful with the decision or 
advice of what to do. To illustrate this, it can be thought of as the difference between 
winning a sure $500 and winning $1000 at 50 percent probability, even though from the 
expected value point, these are equivalent. The risk tolerance is different from person to 
person and has to be considered in the interpretation of the insights provided by game 
theory. 
When there is a choice between a pure strategy and mixed, i.e., that yield the 
same value, it is preferable to choose a pure strategy solution. First, it guarantees the 
outcome in every play. Second, a pure strategy solution is usually easier to implement. 
One does not have to care about randomization of the strategies or their coordination. 
Furthermore, pure strategy solution does not require secrecy as a part of the strategy. The 
results of the game will not be influenced by the opponent’s knowledge of one’s next 
move. However, secrecy is hard to achieve in real life; therefore, pure strategy solutions 
are preferable. 
 6
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III. ZERO-SUM GAMES – PURE STRATEGIES  
A. DOMINANT AND DOMINATED STRATEGIES 
In order to ensure a clear understanding of the terms, it’s important to start with 
the definitions. 
Definitions: 
 “A strategy S dominates strategy T if every outcome in S is at least as good as the 
corresponding outcome in T, and at least one outcome in S is strictly better than the 
corresponding outcome in T.”2 
Dominant strategy is a strategy that dominates all the other strategies of the 
player. 
Dominated strategy is a strategy that is dominated by at least one of the other 
strategies of the player. 
Why would one care about dominance? The reason is articulated in the 
dominance principle, “A rational player should never play a dominated strategy.”3 All the 
outcomes in the dominated strategy are equal or less than the outcomes in some other 
strategy. Therefore, it would not be beneficial for the player to play a dominated strategy. 
The player can always get better outcomes by not playing it, independent of what the 
other player does. 
Dixit and Nalebuff in Thinking Strategically give similar advice: “If you have a 
dominant strategy, use it.”4 The dominant strategy outcomes are always better or equal to 
the outcomes of the player’s other strategies. The game theory assumes rational, value 
                                                 
2 Philip D. Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy, New Mathematical Library, Vol. 36, (Washington: 
Mathematical Association of America, 1993), 8. 
3 Ibid., 8. 
4 Avinash K. Dixit and Barry Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, 
Politics, and Everyday Life, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 1991), 86. 
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maximizing players. The reason for playing a dominant strategy is obvious. If the player 
maximizes and every other strategy is worse, the player should use a dominant strategy. 
1. How to Find Dominant Strategy: 
Consider the following game with our commanders. It is a zero-sum game where 
Rose is trying to maximize and Colin minimize. This time they have three possible 
courses of action and the game with Rose’s payoffs is: 
                    Colin
                A     B    C  
2 3 5A
Rose  9 6 7B
4 3 4C
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
The easiest way for one to find a dominant strategy is to place a mark at the 
maximum value in each column. When the marks are all in the same row, one can see 
that this row is Rose’s dominant strategy, and she should always play it because all of the 
other strategies are either worse or indifferent for her. 
                    Colin
                A       B      C  
2 3 5 A
Rose  9* 6* 7*B
4 3 4 C
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
One can repeat the same process for Colin. Only this time one places the mark at 
the minimum value in each row. As shown, the marks are not in the same column and 
Colin does not have a dominant strategy. 
                    Colin
                A       B      C  
2* 3  5 A
Rose  9 6* 7 B
4 3* 4 C
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
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Colin’s best response for Rose-B is to play Colin-B, as it gives him the best value 
that he can achieve. The solution of the game is then Rose-B, Colin-B with the value of 
the game equal to 6. 
Unfortunately, not all of the games are this simple. 
B. SADDLE POINT 
Definition: Saddle point 
“An outcome in a game (with the payoffs to the row player - maximizing) is called 
a saddle point if the entry at the outcome is both less than or equal to any entry in its 
row, and greater than or equal to any entry in its column.” 5 
At this point, it is useful to read again von Neumann MiniMax theorem. A saddle 
point is a special case where both players can reach the value of the game by playing one 
of the strategies 100 percent of the time. 
Saddle point principle: “If a matrix game has a saddle point, both players should 
play a strategy which contains it.”6 
The reason behind the saddle point principle is obvious. The value of the saddle 
point guarantees the outcome for both players. Switching to any other strategy gives an 
opponent a chance to respond with the strategy that is beneficial to him. However, when 
the player uses saddle point strategy, the opponent can only do worse. To sum up, no 
player has incentive to change a strategy and leave the saddle point strategy combination. 
This is illustrated in the 3-D model of the game, where the payoffs are depicted as 
the height. The saddle point is the lowest point in one direction and the highest from the 
other. The optimal choice is to stay there. On a chart, one can also see why this point is 
called a saddle point; with a little bit of imagination, it looks like a saddle. 
                                                 
5 Philip D.Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy, New Mathematical Library, Vol. 36, (Washington: 
Mathematical Association of America, 1993), 9. 











Now that it is known why the saddle point is important for the solution of the 
game, the subsequent question is, “How can one find it?”  There are two options. For 
simple games, one can use the arrow method. As the game gets bigger and more 
complicated, it is better to use a more general numerical method. 
1. Arrow Method 
Consider the following game with commanders: it is a zero-sum game where 
Rose is trying to maximize and Colin minimize. Each commander can focus on three 
strategies. 
                              Colin
                         C1  C2    C3
R1 3 1 2
Rose           R2 6 4 6
R3 3 1 2
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
Working systematically, one starts with Rose as she is trying to maximize the 
payoffs and prefers the higher values. When Colin is playing C1, Rose prefers to play R2 
over R1 and R2 over R3. Accordingly, one places the arrows with the direction from the 
lower entries (Payoffs) to the higher entries in the same column and continues with the 
same procedure in the remaining columns. 
When the preference arrows for Rose have been completed, one does the same for 
Colin. However, this time as Colin is trying to minimize, he prefers lower payoffs. 
Accordingly, the arrow goes in direction from higher to lower entries in the rows. 
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                                                      Colin
                                        C1              C2              C3
3 1 2R1
Rose                          R2 6 4 6
R3 3 1 2
→ ←⎛ ⎞⎜ ↓ ↓ ↓⎜⎜ → ←⎜ ↑ ↑ ↑⎜⎜ → ←⎝
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
 
Saddle point is the entry where no arrow aims out of the saddle point. If we do not 
depict the indifferent values, it is the value where all of the arrows aim in. In this 
example, it is the combination Rose-R2, Colin-C2 and the value of the game  
is 4. 
2. General Numerical Method 
Finding a saddle point using the arrow method is a little bit confusing when the 
players have more than three strategies. The game table is easily filled with arrows and 
the probability of potential error increases. In this case, it is better for one to use a 
numerical method using the MaxiMin and MiniMax. 
Consider the following game with our commanders. It is a zero-sum game where 
Rose is trying to maximize and Colin minimize, and each commander has five strategies 
from which to choose. 
                                                      Colin
                                         C1    C2    C3   C4   C5    Minimum in Row
1 0 4 1 5R1
6 2 6 8 0R2
1 3 5 7 1Rose                          R3





5 4 4 Maximum of Minimum
3 2 1 4 8 1 (MaxiMin)
Maximum in Column  7 4 7 8 8
                                Minimum of Maximum (MiniMax)
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
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Rose Maximin = 4
Colin Minimax = 4
Rose Maximin = Colin Minimax = 4 = Value of the Game  
One starts with Rose. Rose wants to maximize her payoff. In this case she chooses 
the strategy R1; she can get no less than 0 (Colin-C2). It is the minimum payoff for 
strategy R1. She can do the same for the rest of her strategies. Now she has the worst-
case values of her respective strategies. From these strategies, she should pick the 
strategy that gives her the highest payoff. In other words, she should choose the 
maximum payoff from the minimum payoffs in row. This strategy/strategies are called 
MaxiMin strategy. By choosing the MaxiMin strategy, she guarantees herself at least the 
MaxiMin value. If Colin does not play optimally, she can get more, because all of the 
payoffs in the MaxiMin strategy are equal or higher. 
Now the game is analyzed from Colin’s point of view. He wants the payoffs to be 
as small as possible. Accordingly, one calculates the worst outcomes for each of his 
strategies. This time, it is the maximum values in columns. His payoff for the chosen 
strategy cannot be worse than the maximum in the column. Colin is minimizing, so he 
should choose the strategy with the lowest maximum. These strategies are called the 
MiniMax strategy. 
If the value of Rose’s MaxiMin strategy and Colin’s MiniMax strategy are the 
same, the saddle point has been found, and the game is solved. Saddle point lies at the 
intersection of the MaxiMin and MiniMax strategy. Assuming both players play 
optimally, no player can get a better outcome by switching to some other strategy. In the 
example, the saddle point is at Rose-R4 and Colin-C2 with the value of the game at 4. 
The process then is for one to first write the minimum values in each row right of 
the matrix and mark the maximum of the minimum values.  Second, one writes the 
maximum values in each column and marks the maximum of the minimum values. If the 




a. Games with More than One Saddle Point 
The zero-sum game can have more than one saddle point. In this case, all 
the saddle points have the same value and nicely form a rectangle. 
                                                      Colin
                                         C1    C2    C3   C4   C5    Minimum in Row
3 1 6 2 2R1
R2 7 4 5 4 7
Rose                          R3 3 3 2 1 3





4 5 4 Maximum of Minimum
3 1 2 3 8 1 (MaxiMin)
Maximum in Column  7 4 6 4 8
                                Minimum of Maximum (MiniMax)
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
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IV. ZERO-SUM GAMES – MIXED STRATEGIES 
Not all of the games have a saddle point and solution in the pure strategies. If the 
MaxiMin and MiniMax are not the same, the players can still play their MiniMax and 
MaxiMin strategies, but the outcome is not optimal; they can do better by playing some 
mix of strategies. 
Mixed strategy is “a strategy that involves the random choice of pure strategies, 
according to particular probabilities. A mixed strategy of a player is optimal if it 
guarantees the value of the game.”7 
The definition has a couple of key points deserving explanation. First, the choice 
has to be truly random. Unlike the games with the saddle point where secrecy is not 
required for successful play, in the mixed strategies secrecy is crucial. The opponent who 
knows in advance, what the choice of strategy would be, can take advantage of the 
knowledge and respond with his best counter strategy. A better way to surprise the 
opponent is to surprise oneself and entrust the choice to some random generator or choice 
picker. In nature, there are plenty of random events or technical means that can be used. 
Next, what are these particular probabilities? Probability indicates the relative 
frequency of playing a strategy. In theory, a player can choose the probabilities at will, 
and, of course, the sum of the probabilities has to be equal to one. Any particular 
probabilities can be played. However, in the game theory arena, one is assumed to be a 
rational, value-maximizing player. Therefore, one hopes to find a probability mix that can 
guarantee the player his best achievable outcome against the optimally playing opponent. 
From von Neumann’s MiniMax theorem, it is clear that the mix guarantees the value of 
the game. 
                                                 
7 Consortium for Mathematics and Its Applications, For all Practical Purposes: Mathematical 
Literacy in Today's World, 6th ed. (New York: W.H. Freeman, 2003), 582. 
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A. HOW TO SOLVE OPTIMAL MIXED STRATEGIES 
In the following, methods for finding the optimal strategy mix are described, and 
the thesis covers the following: the method of using the graphical description of the 
game, the expected value method, and Williams’s method of oddments. Additionally, the 
thesis will explain how to convert the game into a linear program and leave the 
numerically difficult process to the software solvers. 
As an illustrative example, two volleyball teams will try to decide what plays to 
make. In volleyball, basically, there are two options for the offensive team. It can either 
try to overcome the opponent by attacking from the center or from the side. The opponent 
faces the question of where to prepare the blocks. Rose is captain of the offensive team, 
and Colin is the captain of blocking team. Success percentages of the offensive team 
follows. 
                                   Colin - blocking
                                     center    side    
side 0.7 0.2
Rose - attacking  
center 0.3 0.8
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
Neither team has a dominant strategy, nor is there a saddle point. What should 
they decide to play? 
1. Graphical Method 
The Graphical method is a basic and easy way of solving the game. However, the 
results are not precise enough, so one must be careful with the interpretations. One must 
question the sensitivity of the resulting mix of strategies; however, sometimes it is good 
enough. 
A graphical depiction of the game8 with a separate graph for each team is shown 
below. 
                                                 










-0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25
Rose Pure Side Attack Rose Pure Center Attack
Colin Pure Block center Colin Pure Block Side










-0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25
Rose Pure Side Attack Rose Pure Center Attack
Colin Pure Block center Colin Pure Block Side
Value of the Game / q Value of the Game
 
The values from the graphs can be readily understood. In the example, Rose’s 
optimal mixed strategy is to attack 50 percent of the time from the side and 50 percent of 
the time from the center. Over time, this assures her success at 0.5 (value of the game). 
Colin’s optimal strategy is to prepare the block at the center 60 percent of the time and 40 
percent from the side. The value of the game is the same, a 50 percent success for the 
offensive side. 
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2. Expected Value Method 
The Expected value method is a general method for solving a game. Equalizing 
the expected value for an opponent’s strategies is a universal method for any zero-sum 
game. In principle, one is trying to find a mix of strategies that removes the opponent’s 
decisions from consideration. If the expected value for any mix of opponent’s strategies 
is equal, it does not matter what the opponent plays, the value of the game stays the same. 
If p is assigned as the probability of strategy for Rose-Center, the probability of 
strategy for Rose-Side is then 1-p (sum of probabilities has to be 1). Accordingly, for 
Colin-Side the probability is q and Colin-Center is 1-q.   
                                   Colin - blocking
                                     center    side    
side 0.7 0.2 1
Rose - attacking  
center 0.3 0.8




−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
q
 
Now, the game is analyzed from Rose’s point of view: 
If Colin would play his Pure-Center, Rose can expect the payoff to be: 
(Colin-Center) 0.7*(1 ) 0.3*EV p p= − +  
If Colin would play his Pure-Side, Rose can expect the payoff to be: 
(Colin-Side) 0.2*(1 ) 0.8*EV p p= − +  
As stated earlier, the goal is to try to remove the opponent’s decision from 
consideration. If these two expected values are equal, it does not matter what Colin plays. 
One can solve the following equation with one unknown variable. 
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(Colin-Center) (Colin-Side)
0.7*(1 ) 0.3* 0.2*(1 ) 0.8*
0.7 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.8




Value of the Game 0.7*0.5 0.3*0.5 0.35 0.15 0.5
EV EV
p p p p






− + = − +





= + = + =
 
The solution for Rose: Rose’s optimal strategy is to attack 50 percent at the center 
and 50 percent at the side. She can expect to have a success ratio of 0.5. 
Similarly, from Colin’s point of view: 
If Rose would play her Pure-Side, Colin can expect the payoff to be: 
(Rose-Side) 0.7*(1 ) 0.2*EV q q= − +  
If Rose would play her Pure-Center, Colin can expect the payoff to be: 
(Rose-Center) 0.3*(1 ) 0.8*EV q q= − +  
Equalizing and solving: 
(Rose-Side) (Rose-Center)
0.7*(1 ) 0.2* 0.3*(1 ) 0.8*
0.7 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.8




Value of the game 0.7*0.6 0.2*0.4 0.42 0.08 0.5
EV EV
q q q q






− + = − +





= + = + =
 
The solution for Colin: Colin’s optimal strategy is to prepare 60 percent at the 
center and 40 percent at the side. He can expect to lower Rose’s success ratio to 0.5. 
 The expected value principle is used in linear programming techniques for 
solving games with many strategies. 
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3. William’s Method of Oddments 
William’s method of oddments is used for solving 2x2 zero-sum games without a 
saddle point (check for pure strategy solution first). Some people find it easier than the 
expected value method. The weakness of the method is in its limited usability; it is valid 
only for games with two players and two strategies each. 
                                   Colin - blocking
                                     center    side    
0.7 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5/(0.5 0.5) 0.5side 0.7 0.2
Rose - attacking  
0.center 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.5
− = + =⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ − =⎝ ⎠ 5 0.5/(0.5 0.5) 0.5
                              0.7 0.3 0.2 0.8
                                      0.4 0.6
  
                                       0.6 0.4




                                        0.6 0.4
 
The method is shown above. For Rose, one must take absolute value of the 
difference between the payoffs for her respective strategy. If one interchanges the 
absolute values, the ratio with which she should play the strategies is then discovered. 
The same procedure is repeated for Colin. Simple but limited. 
B. REDUCTION OF THE GAME USING ELIMINATION OF THE 
DOMINATED STRATEGIES 
When one tries to solve the game using pen and paper, it is useful to simplify the 
game by trying to reduce the number of strategies of each player. Assuming that no 
rational player would play the dominated strategy, the payoffs in this strategy can be 
deleted from the matrix. After deleting a dominated strategy, one forms a new matrix and 




dominated strategies. Even when players do not have the dominant strategy in the 
original game, after the reduction there can be a dominant strategy. At the very least, any 
irrelevant strategies have been eliminated. 
Example: 
                                                      Colin
                                        C1    C2    C3   C4   C5    
R1 4 2 5 2 3
R2 2 1 0 2 2
Rose                          R3 3 2 4 2 4
R4 5 0 6 1 1





Rose-R2 is dominated by Rose-R3Î Delete 
                                                      Colin
                                        C1    C2    C3   C4   C5    
R1 4 2 5 2 3
R2
Rose                          R3 3 2 4 2 4
R4 5 0 6 1 1
R5 1 3 7 8 7
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝ ⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟
 
Colin-C3, C4 and C5 are dominated by Colin-C2 Î Delete 
                                                      Colin
                                        C1    C2    C3   C4   C5    
R1 4 2
R2
Rose                          R3 3 2
R4 5 0
R5 1 3
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
Rose-R3 is dominated by Rose-R1 Î Delete R3. The game has been reduced 
from 5x5 to 3x2. 
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Resulting game after the reduction of irrelevant (dominated) strategies 
                                          Colin
                                        C1   C2    
R1 4 2
Rose                          R4 5 0
R5 1 3
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
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V. PARTIAL-SUM GAMES 
In the partial-sum (non zero-sum) game, the payoffs of the players are not strictly 
opposed. The success of one player does not always mean failure for the other. As the 
interests of the players are not totally in conflict, such a game offers the opportunities for 
cooperation in order to achieve mutually advantageous outcomes. These opportunities do 
not rule out the competitive side of the game. Players still want to achieve their best 
possible outcome. 
Cooperation requires communication in order to achieve some coordinated 
strategy. As communication is the key component, partial-sum will be analyzed with 
three different assumptions. The game can be played: 
1) Without Communication 
2) With Communication before the game 
3) With Cooperation 
A. PARETO PRINCIPLE 
As is shown in the previous chapters, it is rational for the player to play a 
dominant strategy (if he has one) in the zero-sum game.  Does this principle apply in the 
partial-sum games? The following game attempts to answer this question. 
                      Colin 
                   C           D    
A (3, 3) (1, 4)
Rose  
B (4, 1) (2, 2)
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
Both players have a dominant strategy. Rose gets better outcomes by playing 
Rose-B and Colin by playing Colin-D. When both players use their dominant strategy the 
result is BD [2,2]. However, looking at the game, outcome AC [3,3] is better for both of 
them. In this game, use of the dominant strategy leads to the less preferable outcome. 
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Economist Wilfredo Pareto proposed that one should not accept the solution when there 
is some other possibility, which is better for everybody involved. 
Pareto Principle: “To be acceptable as a solution of the game, an outcome should 
be Pareto Optimal.” 9 
Pareto Optimal: The outcome where neither player can improve payoff without 
hurting (decreasing the payoff) of the other player. 
As in this case, group rationality (Pareto) is sometimes in conflict with the 
individual rationality (dominant). The eventual outcome depends on the players. 
Obtaining a Pareto optimal outcome usually requires some sort of communication and 
cooperation among the players. 
With the assumption that the outcome should be Pareto optimal, the next question 
is, “What is Pareto optimal, and what is it not (Pareto inferior)?” The simplest way for 
this to be understood is to draw a payoff polygon of the game. On the chart, the X-axis 
depicts the payoffs of Rose, and the Y-axis depicts the payoffs of Colin. By plotting the 
pure strategy solutions on the chart, one can see that the convex (everything inside) 
polygon enclosing the pure strategy solutions is then the payoff polygon or the feasible 
region. Therefore, the points inside the polygon are the possible solutions of the game. 
Graphically: 
A:C [3 , 3]
A:D [1 , 4]
B:C [4 , 1]











0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
Pareto optimal 
 
                                                 
9 Philip D.Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy, New Mathematical Library, Vol. 36, (Washington: 
Mathematical Association of America, 1993), 69. 
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The solution point is Pareto optimal when there is not some other possible 
solution point north / east / north-east of this point. If one were to imagine (draw) lines 
heading north and east from this point and find that there are no possible solutions in this 
quadrant, the point is Pareto optimal. Pareto optimal points form the northeastern 
boundary of the payoff polygon. In the chart above, it is line AD-AC, and AC-BC. 
Pareto optimal can be just a single point, line segment, or several line segments. 
Examples of some polygons and their Pareto optimal outcomes: 
A:C [4 , 4]
A:D [2 , 3]
B:C [3 , 2]











0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
A:C [4 , 4]
A:D [2 , 3]
B:C [4 , 2]











0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
A:C [3 , 3]
A:D [1 , 2]
B:C [4 , 1]









0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
A:C [2 , 3]
A:D [5 , 0]
B:C [4 , 1]









0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Pareto Optimal
 
The lower right game is actually a constant sum game, which can be converted 
into a zero-sum. In the zero-sum game, all outcomes are Pareto optimal. 
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VI. PARTIAL-SUM GAMES WITHOUT COMMUNICATION 
A. EQUILIBRIUMS 
As the zero-sum games have a saddle point, the partial-sum games have 
equilibriums. Correspondingly, once the players play the strategies forming equilibrium, 
they cannot unilaterally improve their payoffs. 
For finding the equilibrium outcomes in the pure strategy, the same idea of 
movement diagram, as in the zero-sum games, is used. Only this time each player has a 
separate set of payoffs. It is necessary to compare appropriate values. 
                            Colin 
                   C                     D    
A (3, 3) (1, 4)
Rose  
B (4, 1) (2, 2)
⎛ ⎞→⎜ ⎟↓ ↓⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟→⎝ ⎠
  
                            Colin 
                   C                     D    
(4, 4) (1, 3)A
Rose  
B (3, 1) (2, 2)
⎛ ⎞←⎜ ⎟↑ ↓⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟→⎝ ⎠
 
In the left game, both players have a dominant strategy and BD [2,2] is the 
probable outcome without communication. Rose-B and Colin-D is also an equilibrium 
outcome, as all arrows are heading in.10 The right game has two equilibriums, AC [4,4] 
and BD [2,2]. 
In the zero-sum games, saddle points do not always exist. The same applies for 
partial-sum games. To illustrate, one should consider the game below. This game does 
not have pure strategy equilibrium. There is no point where all arrows are heading in. 
 
                            Colin 




←⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟↓ ↑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟→⎝ ⎠
 
                                                 
10 More precisely, none of the arrows is heading out. 
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John F. Nash proved that every two-person game has at least one equilibrium 
either in Pure or in Mixed strategies.11  The equilibriums are also called Nash 
Equilibriums. Nash Equilibrium in the mixed strategy is formed by equalizing strategies 
of the respective players. 
B. EQUALIZING STRATEGIES 
Equalizing strategies, if adopted, assure that neither player can gain by switching 
to some other strategy. The use of equalizing strategy ‘stymies’ the other player’s 
position and removes his choices from consideration. 
In the game above, Rose can equalize the payoffs of Colin when she plays Colin’s 
game and Colin’s game is the zero-sum game with Colin’s payoffs. 
Colin's Game / Rose - Equalizing / Colin Maximizing
                      Colin 




←⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟↓ ↓⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟→⎝ ⎠
 
This game has a saddle point at BD. However, B and D are not equalizing 


















-0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25
Rose Pure A Rose Pure B Colin Pure C Colin Pure D  mixed 
Minimizing
 
                                                 
11 John F. Nash, "Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games," Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America 36, no. 1 (January 15, 1950): 48-49. 
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In this case, Rose’s Equalizing strategy ½ A and ½ B is not Rose’s optimal 
strategy. However, it equalizes Colin’s payoffs. It does not matter what Colin does; his 
payoff will be 2.5. Rose can stymie Colin’s position when she plays the intersection of 
the lines Colin-Pure C and Colin-Pure D. For calculation of the probabilities one can use 
either the expected value method or method of oddments.  One would do well to 








+ =  
In other words, they have to intersect between Rose-Pure A and Rose-Pure B; 
otherwise, the equalizing strategy does not exist.  
Similarly, Colin can equalize Rose’s payoffs by playing an equalizing strategy in 
Rose’s game. 
Rose's game / Colin - Equalizing / Rose - Maximizing
                      Colin 























-0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25
Rose Pure A Rose Pure B Colin Pure C Colin Pure D  mixed 
 
Colin’s equalizing strategy is ½ C and ½ D. This will give Rose the payoff 2.5. If 
both players play equalizing strategy, the result is the Nash Equilibrium point [2.5,2.5]. 
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Nash equilibriums in partial-sum games have some problematic properties. In the 
zero-sum games, saddle points were equivalent and interchangeable. They were also 
Pareto optimal. None of these carry over to partial-sum games. 
 
                            Colin 
                   C                    D    
(4, 4) (1, 3)A
Rose  
B (3, 1) (2, 2)




















0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
 
 
The game above has three Nash Equilibriums: two in pure strategies and one in 
mixed strategy. Each one of the Nash Equilibriums, once adopted, fixes the players’ 
payoffs, and players can not unilaterally improve their position. Each equilibrium is 
different, so for which one should they try? In this game, the answer is simple because 
point AC[4,4] is Pareto optimal. However, this is not always the case. 
As the outcomes for Nash Equilibrium in a mixed strategy are obtained from the 
other player’s game without regard to one’s own payoffs, the resulting outcome for the 
players is usually low. 
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C. PRUDENTIAL STRATEGIES – STATUS QUO 
The player’s worst-case scenario in the partial-sum game happens when the 
opponent turns hostile. The opponent’s goal is no longer to maximize his own payoffs, 
but to minimize the payoffs of the other. What should the player do in such a case? What 
is his optimal strategy? 
A consideration of the following game will help illustrate: 
                      Colin 
                   C           D    
A (2, 1) (3, 2)
Rose  
B (4, 3) (1, 4)
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
When Colin turns hostile and tries to minimize Rose’s payoffs, he disregards his 
own payoffs. Now it is a zero-sum game with Rose’s payoffs, and Rose should play her 
MaxiMin strategy in order to assure herself at least the value of game. 
Rose's Game / Rose - Maximizing / Colin - Minimizing 
                  Colin 
                C        D    
A 2     3
Rose  
B 4     1
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
Rose’s optimal strategy in this game is to play ¾ A and ¼ B with the value of the 
game 2.5. In a partial-sum game, this strategy is called Rose’s prudential strategy and 
the corresponding value of the game is called Rose’s security level. No matter what 
Colin does, Rose can guarantee herself at least the security level. 
Similarly for Colin, when Rose turns hostile, Colin should respond with his 
prudential strategy in his game. 
Colin's Game / Colin - Maximizing / Rose - Minimizing 
                  Colin 
                C        D    
A 1     2
Rose  
B 3     4
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
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Colin’s game has a saddle point at AD, and his prudential strategy is to play D all 
the time with the security level (value of the game) equal to 2. 
The intersection of the security levels is called a status quo. The players can not 
do worse even in the worst possible scenario. From the payoff polygon of the game 
below, it is obvious that the outcome is not Pareto Optimal. The outcome also is not 
equilibrium. Both players can do better by playing some other strategy mix. There is still 







Xo - Rose's 
Security Level



















Minimax strategies in the zero-sum games produce stability. This does not apply 
in the partial-sum games and “there is no cogent general solution concept for non-zero-
sum games.”12 However, games where there exists at least one Pareto optimal 
equilibrium outcome or there are more such outcomes, which are equivalent and 
interchangeable, are solvable in the strict sense. These Pareto optimal equilibriums are 
reasonable outcomes of the game13 in the games without communication. 
                                                 
12 Philip D.Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy, New Mathematical Library, Vol. 36, (Washington: 
Mathematical Association of America, 1993), 70. 
13 Ibid., 70. 
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VII. PARTIAL-SUM GAMES – COMMUNICATION  
BEFORE THE GAME 
Up to this point, the games were played without communication between the 
players. This chapter gives an overview of what can happen when the players can 
communicate and how communication influences the outcomes of the game. 
In this chapter, players will try to unilaterally improve their position by making 
conditional or unconditional commitments called strategic moves. They will not 
cooperate. The problem of communication lies in credibility. The purpose of this text is 
not to offer a guide for achieving credibility of communication. Rather, the thesis focuses 
on analyzing what options players have, and the credibility of their commitment is taken 
as a given. 
A. FIRST MOVE 
The first move can be described as the ability of the player to either make a move 
(play a strategy) before the other player or make a commitment to play some strategy 
under all circumstances. These options are considered interchangeable during an analysis 
of the game. The critical question remains: is it preferable for the player to play first or 
force the other player to move first? 
                      Colin 
                   C           D    
A (4, 2) (1, 1)
Rose  
B (2, 3) (3, 4)
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
In this game, neither player has a dominant strategy. The likely outcome, without 
communication, can be BC [2,3] as the intersection of maximin strategies Rose-B, Colin-
C. Can the players improve their outcome by playing the first move or forcing the other 
to play? 
The illustration begins with Rose: What will happen when Rose plays A and what 
will happen when she plays B? If Rose plays Rose-A, then Colin, looking at his outcome, 
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would choose Colin-C, as it gives him a higher payoff than Colin-D. The result is AC 
[4,2]. If Rose plays Rose-B, then Colin replies with D, and the outcome is BD [3,4]. By 
comparing these two outcomes, one can see that it is better for Rose to play A, as it gives 
Rose her best outcome with the payoff 4. Still further one can question whether the 
outcome is better than the likely outcome without communication. In this case the answer 
is yes; therefore, it is preferable for Rose to play first (Rose-A) in order to get her best 
outcome. 
If Rose A  then Colin C   [4 , 2]
If Rose B  then Colin D   [3 , 4]
Better for Rose [4 ,2]
Better than Rose's likely outcome? Yes
 
The same can be done for Colin. Colin has a first move to play D with Rose 
responding B. This gives Colin his best outcome DB [3,4]. 
If Colin C  then Rose A   [4, 2]
If Colin D  then Rose B   [3, 4]
Better for Colin [3, 4]
Better than Colin's likely outcome? Yes
 
To illustrate further, another example is given. Again the players do not have 
dominant strategies so the likely outcome, when Rose and Colin play maximin strategies, 
is AC [2,3] 
                      Colin 
                   C           D    
A (2, 3) (3, 1)
Rose  
B (4, 2) (1, 4)
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
First move Rose: 
If Rose A  then Colin C   [2 , 3]
If Rose B  then Colin D   [1 , 4]
Better for Rose [2 ,3]
Better than Rose's likely outcome? Equal
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Rose has a first move, but the result is not better than the likely outcome without 
communication. Nevertheless, Rose can secure her likely outcome by playing Rose-A. 
First move Colin: 
If Colin C  then Rose B   [4, 2]
If Colin D  then Rose A   [3, 1]
Better for Colin [4, 2]
Better than Colin's likely outcome? No
 
Colin does not have a first move. In both cases, Rose can respond with a strategy 
that is worse for Colin than the likely outcome. Looking at Rose’s payoffs one can see 
that it is beneficial for Rose to force Colin to move first. If Colin has to move, he would 
likely choose to play C (better than D). Rose would then play Rose-A and get her best 
outcome. 
The Game of Chicken is an example of a game where both players can get their 
best outcome by making the first move. 
B. THREAT 
Threat is one type of conditional commitment. It is a commitment to play a 
certain strategy as a reaction to the opponent’s choice of strategy. In the case of threat, it 
hurts both players. If the other player believes it (the threat is credible), one of the pure 
strategy solutions is taken out of consideration. How can one know whether the players 
have the option of making a threat? 
                      Colin 
                   C           D    
A (1, 1) (3, 2)
Rose  
B (4, 3) (2, 4)
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
In this game, Colin has a dominant strategy Colin-D and the likely outcome 
without communication can be AD [3,2]. The example begins with Colin. Does Colin 
have a threat? 
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Without communication, Rose plays A. However, Colin would like to force Rose 
to play B, so his threat is against A. He says, “If you (Rose) play A, I (Colin) will 
sacrifice my payoffs in order to hurt you. Normally I would play D, but if you play A, I 
will respond with C.” 
The following analyzes whether this is a workable threat: 
[ ]
Normally:
If Rose A then Colin D    3  , 2
Threat:
If Rose A  then Colin C   [1 ,1]              It hurts Colin, hurts Rose it is a threat
If Rose B  then Colin D   [2 , 4]
Better for Rose [2 , 4]
Better than Colin's likely outcome? Yes
 
Colin would normally respond with D at Rose-A. His threat is to play C as a 
response to Rose-A. The threat hurts both players, as their payoffs are lower than an 
outcome without communication. If Rose plays B, Colin will play D. Now Rose has to 
decide what is better for her. She chooses between AC [1,1] and BD[2,4].  Therefore it is 
better for Rose to play B, as it gives her a higher payoff (1<2).  The outcome of the game 
is then BD, and Colin gets his best outcome. Colin has a threat, and it works alone. 
In the same vein, Rose is analyzed. She would like to force Colin to play C and 
she threatens D. 
[ ]
Normally:
If Colin D then Rose A    3  , 2
Threat:
If Colin D  then Rose B   [2   ,4]     It hurts Rose, but it is benficial to Colin - Not a threat  
Rose does not have a threat, as her conditional commitment would be beneficial 
to Colin. 
The next game is an example where Rose has a threat, but it does not work 
independently. Colin has a dominant strategy C and the likely outcome, without 
communication, would be AC [2,4]. 
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                      Colin 
                   C           D    
A (2, 4) (3, 3)
Rose  
B (1, 2) (4, 1)
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
Rose would like to force Colin to play D, and her threat is focused on C. 
Normally:
If Colin C  then Rose A   [2 , 4]
Threat:
If Colin C  then Rose B   [1, 2] It hurts Colin, hurts Rose; it is a threat
If Colin D  then Rose B   [4, 1]
Better for Colin [1, 2]
 
Even with Rose’s threat, it is still better for Colin to play C. By playing C, Colin 
gets 2 which is a better outcome than complying with the threat and getting 1. Sometimes 
when a player has a threat which does not work by itself, the player can combine it with 
some other conditional move. 
C. PROMISE 
Another type of conditional move is called the promise. The promise is hurtful 
for a player and beneficial to the opponent. As in the case of the threat, a promise has 
an ability to remove one pure strategy solution from consideration. Again, it is necessary 
to first explore whether the player has the option to make a promise and then how the 
game would evolve. 
                      Colin 
                   C           D    
A (2, 2) (3, 1)
Rose  
B (4, 3) (1, 4)
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
In this game, neither player has a dominant strategy. The players would probably 
play their maximin strategies. The likely outcome, without communication, is AC [2,2]. 
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Colin would like to persuade Rose to play B. His promise then focuses on this 
strategy.14  Normally, if Rose plays B, Colin responds with D and the resulting payoff is 




If Rose B then Colin D    1  , 4
Promise:
If Rose B  then Colin C   [4 , 3]              It hurts Colin, beneficial to Rose; it is a promise
If Rose A  then Colin C   [2 , 2]
Better for Rose [4 , 3]
Better than Colin's likely outcome? Yes
The conditions for the existence of promise have been met. The promise hurts Colin and 
is beneficial to Rose. For Rose it is advantageous to comply; she can get her best 
outcome. By doing so, she allows Colin to get his second best outcome, which is better 
than the likely outcome without communication. Colin has a threat, which works 
independently. 
Now to consider a previous game where Rose has a threat which does not work 
alone; does she have a promise? As a reminder, Colin has a dominant strategy C and the 
likely outcome without communication would be AC[2,4]. 
                      Colin 
                   C           D    
A (2, 4) (3, 3)
Rose  
B (1, 2) (4, 1)
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
Rose would like Colin to play D. Her promise focuses on D. 
                                                 
14 Threat is focused (threatens) on the strategy which the player would like to eliminate and promise is 




If Colin D then Rose B    4  ,1
Promise:
If Colin D  then Rose A   [3, 3]              It hurts Rose, beneficial to Colin; it is a promise
If Colin C  then Rose A   [2, 4]
Better for Colin [2, 4]
Rose has a promise to play A in case Colin plays D. It hurts her and is beneficial to Colin. 
However, it is still better for Colin to play C and get his best outcome. 
D. COMBINATION OF THREATS AND PROMISES 
In the last game, Rose has a threat and promise and neither one works 
independently. What if Rose were to make the threat and promise together? 
                      Colin 
                   C           D    
A (2, 4) (3, 3)
Rose  
B (1, 2) (4, 1)
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
Threat:
If Colin C then Rose B [1 , 2]
Promise:
If Colin D then Rose A[3 , 3]
Better for Colin [3 , 3]
 
In this case, when threat eliminates outcome AC [2,4] and promise eliminates BD 
[4,1], Colin has to choose between the remaining two options. It is better for him to play 
D with the result AD [3,3]. The result is second best for Rose, and the combination of 
threat and promise works for her. 
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VIII. PARTIAL-SUM GAMES – COOPERATIVE SOLUTION 
Up to this point, this thesis has analyzed the partial-sum game with the 
assumption of non-cooperation between the players. The players either did not 
communicate at all, or tried to improve their position unilaterally by using some sort of 
strategic moves. The results were not always Pareto optimal; this means that there was 
room for improvement for at least one of the players without hurting the other. Now the 
thesis looks at the game from a different strategic perspective. 
Assumption: the players decide to cooperate in order to improve their payoffs. 
They can sit behind the negotiation table and make an agreement or they can call for the 
help of an outside arbiter to solve their problem. 
Von Neumann and Morgensten proposed that the arbitrated solution to the partial-
sum game should be (1) Pareto optimal and (2) at or above the security level of the 
players.15 This appears reasonable. Pareto optimal outcome tells us that there is no other 
outcome better for both players or better for one player without hurting the other. The at-
or-above the security level condition ensures that no player is forced to accept the 
solution that is worse for him than the solution of the game played without 
communication. These two combined conditions give the range of solutions from which 
to choose. They are called the negotiation set. Look at an example. 
                      Colin 
                   C           D    
A (4, 2) (3, 0)
Rose  
B (1, 1) (2, 4)
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
                                                 
15 John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 60th 
anniversary ed. (Princeton, N.J.; Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
 42
A:C [4 , 2]
A:D [3 , 0]
B:C [1 , 1]
B:D [2 , 4]












0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Negotiation Set
 
The next question that needs consideration involves the point from the negotiation 
set the arbiter should choose. Considering that there are many points in the negotiation 
set, one must discern which one is fair. 
A. NASH ARBITRATION SCHEME 
Definition: 
“If SQ(status quo)=(x0,y0), then the arbitrated solution point N is the point (x,y) in 
the polygon with x≥ x0 and y≥y0 which maximizes the product (x- x0)*(y- y0 ).”16 
Status quo point in the definition is the likely outcome of the game when the 
negotiation fails. An arbitrated solution should be better for both players than the status 
quo; this is incorporated in the definition by x≥ x0 and y≥y0. Status quo is the minimum 
the players can get. Everything above is improvement of their gain. The solution has to  
 
                                                 
16 Philip D.Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy, New Mathematical Library, Vol. 36, (Washington: 
Mathematical Association of America, 1993), 105; John F. Nash, "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica 
18, no. 2 (April, 1950): 155. 
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maximize their joint utility. The objective function (x - x0)*(y - y0), maximizes these 
‘above security level’ utilities. In other words, it has to maximize the area of the 
rectangle. 
A:C [4 , 2]
A:D [3 , 0]
B:C [1 , 1]
B:D [2 , 4]


















Solution N is called the Nash Point in honor of John Nash. It turns out that a 
solution lies at ½ of the height (y-axis player) and ½ of the basis (x-axis player) of the 
triangle formed by the Pareto optimal line segment (sometimes has to be extended) and 
status quo lines. Such a solution is fair in some sense. It maximizes the available space 
and gives both players an equal part of what they can expect. 
When the calculated Nash Point is outside of the Pareto optimal line, the solution 
of the game is the closest pure strategy solution (corner point). One could argue that this 
does not give both players an equal share; however, it is still the best (fairest) possible 
solution. 
The arbitrated solution of the game in the Nash arbitration scheme depends on the 
status quo point. Again, one must consider what is likely to happen when the negotiation 
fails. The answer is beyond the scope of game theory, as it has to include many outside 
considerations. One possible choice is the status quo formed by the players’ security 
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levels, as this is the worst-case scenario. It can also be the status quo after some strategic 
moves were used. Nash argued for optimal threat status quo.17 
Calculating the Nash Point as maximization of (x - x0)*(y - y0) is quite 
complicated. An easier approach is described next. However, this equation is useful when 
more than one Pareto optimal line exists and one has to decide upon which line the Nash 
Point lies. This can be resolved by calculation of the payoff for each Pareto optimal pure 
strategy solution. The Nash point lies at the Pareto optimal lines with the highest pure 
strategy payoff. 
B. NASH ARBITRATION – HOW TO SOLVE 
                      Colin 
                   C           D    
A (4, 2) (2, 0)
Rose  
B (1, 3) (3, 4)
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
Rose and Colin are not satisfied with the results of their game above and decide to 
cooperate in order to increase their payoff. They bring their case to the arbiter, and he 
suggests using the Nash arbitration scheme for their problem. Rose and Colin know that 
in case their negotiation fails they would use prudential strategies and end up at the status 
quo SQ[2.5,2]. 
There are two options for solving the new problem. It can be done graphically or 
numerically. It is obvious that a graphical option is easier but less precise. The process is 
illustrated by using a graphical solution, which shows the interdependency of variables. 
1. Graphical Solution of Nash Arbitration 
To begin, one draws a payoff polygon and security levels and determines the 
Pareto optimal line. If the line does not intercept both security levels, then the line must 
be lengthened in order to form a triangle. 
The result looks like this. 
                                                 
17 John F. Nash, "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica 21, no. 1 (January, 1953): 128. 
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A:C [4 , 2]
A:D [2 , 0]
B:C [1 , 3]
B:D [3 , 4]
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The next step includes drawing a rectangle and its diagonal line in order to divide 
the height and basis in two. The Nash point is located at the intersection of the Pareto 
optimal line and the diagonal line. It is possible to measure its coordinates. If it is outside 
the negotiation set, the Nash Point is the closest strategy solution. 
A:C [4 , 2]
A:D [2 , 0]
B:C [1 , 3]
B:D [3 , 4]
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Once the Nash Point is found, one has to decide what the players should do in 
order to achieve an arbitrated outcome. The solution lies at the line segment BD-AC; 
therefore, they have to play these pure strategy options with certain relative frequency 
(probabilities). To discover how often the point should be played, one must measure the 
distance from one of the points to the Nash point and divide it with the overall length of 
the BD-AC line segment. One minus the result gives the answer. The same process 
applies for the second point or just the addition to one. 
The results are that Rose and Colin should play BD 75% of the time and AC 25% 
of the time. They also have to agree upon some system that ensures that they will play 
their strategy in coordination. The game is the most difficult case for coordination. 
Because when Rose plays A, Colin has to play C, and when Rose plays B, Colin has to 
play D. Sometimes it can be easier when only one player has to change the strategy in 
order to get Nash Point. 
2. Numerical Solution of Nash Arbitration 
A simple formula for Nash Point: 




⎛ ⎞+ +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
Where m is the slope of the Pareto optimal line, X0,Y0 are the security levels of the 
respective players and b is the height of the triangle formed by Security Levels and 
Pareto optimal line. 
To begin, one must calculate (enumerate) the equation of the Pareto optimal 




[3, 4], [4, 2]
2 4 2 2
4 3 1
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Next, one calculates the height of the triangle, which is the intercept of the 
Pareto optimal line and X Security Level and subtract Y0. 
0
0
Height of the triangle 























3 32.5 2.5 3.25











⎛ ⎞+ +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
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A graphical depiction of the calculation follows below. 
A:C [4 , 2]
A:D [2 , 0]
B:C [1 , 3]
B:D [3 , 4]
SQ [2.5 , 2]
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What remains is to calculate the relative frequency of the pure strategy options. 
For clearer understanding, the process is depicted in the graph below. 
A:C [ 4 , 2 ]
B:D [ 3 , 4 ]
0.25 0.75
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In the graphical method, the length of the line segments must be measured. It is 
possible to calculate the length of the line segment but there is an easier way: one can 
calculate the difference on the X-axis between the Nash Point and the Pure Strategy 
solution and divide it by the difference between the Pure Strategy solutions. 
1-  is the relative frequency of AC













18   
Absolute value in the equation is there for convenience; it eliminates from 
consideration which number is higher and avoids the confusion of negative numbers. 
Using the equation: 
                                                 
18 AC and BD are from the example, substitute for appropriate strategy combination. 
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AC[4,2] ; BD [3,4]; Nash Point[3.25,3.5]
3.25 4 -0.75











The end result is that the players should cooperate and play pure strategy 
combination AC 25% of the time and pure strategy combination BD 75% of the time. 
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IX. 3-PERSON GAMES 
Up to this point, the thesis has analyzed games involving two players. However, 
most games in the real world involve more than two players, and as the number of 
players increases, the complexity of the game increases enormously. This thesis, 
however, limits the analysis to 3-person zero-sum (constant sum) games.  
This chapter is an introduction into the vast area of n-person19 games. It deals 
with the description of the 3-person game and equilibriums. Furthermore, the chapter 
covers the analysis of likely coalitions among the players and the idea of sidepayments.  
To illustrate, a game with three players is considered. They will be called Rose, 
Colin and Larry. Each player has two strategies from which to choose; therefore, the 
game has 2x2x2=8 possible outcomes. This is described in the form of a tree diagram. 
Larry-E = ACE
Colin-C

























                                                 
19 n is three and more 
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Rose can pick from strategies A and B. Colin responds with C or D. Larry can 
play E or F for each strategy combination of the previous players. The solution and 
payoffs are then determined by a combination of the three pure strategies of the 
respective players. 
A. EQUILIBRIUMS 
As in two person games, it is possible to find equilibriums by using a movement 
diagram. It is just slightly more complicated than in two person games. It is necessary to 
compare appropriate values. For example, Larry’s payoffs for BDE and BDF. The logic 
is as follows: when Rose plays B, and Colin plays D, what is better for Larry? 
The following movement diagram analyzes a zero-sum game among Rose, Colin 
and Larry. 
(1,1,2) (-4,3,1) (3, 2, 1) (-5,12,-7)
                                  






C           Colin          D C           Colin          D
E                        Larry                                  F
Equilibriums  
In this game, Colin has a dominant strategy, Colin-D. The idea of the dominant 
strategy is applicable even in the n-person games. Similarly as in partial-sum, a game 
playing dominant strategy does not assure the best outcome. Nevertheless, without the 
use of communication, if the player has a dominant strategy, it is preferable to use it. 
This game has two equilibriums, ADE and BDF. It can be seen that all arrows are 
heading inward. It is possible to see that in 3-person games, equilibriums are not 
equivalent and interchangeable even in a zero-sum game. They are indifferent for Colin, 
but Rose would prefer BDF[-2,3,-1] and Larry ADE[-4,3,1]. If Larry tries for his favorite 
equilibrium and plays Larry-E, and Rose tries her favorite Rose-B, the result would be 
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BDE(-5,10,-5)20. It is worse for both of them and good news for Colin. There is no 
simple solution theory for what the players should do. 
B. LIKELY COALITIONS 
When the players can communicate, it is natural that they try to form coalitions. 
An illustration of how it would look if Larry and Colin decided to form a coalition 
against Rose is given below. The game is zero-sum, so it is possible to focus only on 
Rose’s payoffs. The resulting sub game is then: 
Rose v. Colin and Larry 
Larry-E Larry-E Larry-F Larry-F
Colin-C Colin-D Colin-C Colin-D
A 1 -4 3 -5
Rose     
B 2 -5 2 -2
 
The best way to play a zero-sum game is to play Maximin/Minimax strategy. This 
prudent strategy assures the value of the game for the players. Using the software toolkit 
provided in the thesis, the optimal strategy of the players is: 
Rose alone:   75% of A and 25% of B 
Coalition Larry & Colin: 75% of DE and 25% of DF 
Value of the game:   -4.25 for Rose / +4.25 for Coalition 
As a result, the coalition wins 4.25. However, this is only half of the answer. It is 
also important for one to know how the payoffs are divided between members of the 
coalition. The payoffs of the players for each strategy combination are different, so it is 
necessary to treat them separately. One begins by calculating the relative frequency of 
playing of each strategy combination. For example, using the ADE strategy combination: 
Rose plays A 75 percent of the time and the coalition plays DE 75 percent of the time. If 
these are multiplied, one gets a relative frequency of ADE that is 56.25 percent. Now, if 
one were to multiply each original payoff for ADE  
                                                 
20 Assuming that Colin plays dominant strategy Colin-D 
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[-4,3,1] by this relative frequency, the adjusted payoffs would be [-2.25, 1.6875, 0.5325]. 
When this is done for all outcomes, the values of each player are added. An illustration of 
this follows: 
 Strategy    Frequency of playing   Original payoffs          Adjusted payoffs
 A x CE .75 0 =0         [1,1,2]
A x DE .75 .75 =0.5625 [-4,3,1]
A x CF .75 0 =0         [3,-2,-1]






       
.25 0 =0         [2,-4,2] [0,0,0]
B x DE .25 .75 =0.1875 [-5,10,-5] [ 0.9375,1.875, 0.93
B x CF .25 0 =0         [2,1,-3]






Sum Up Rose/Colin/Larry                                                  [-4.25,6,-1.75]       
− −
 
Rose receives her value of the game -4.25. Colin receives 6, and Larry receives  
-1.75. Therefore, it is Colin, who is doing well in this coalition. One could consider other 
possible coalitions:  
Colin v. Rose and Larry 
Larry-E Larry-E Larry-F Larry-F
Rose-A Rose-B Rose-A Rose-B
C 1 -4 -2 1
Colin     
D 3 10 12 3
 
Results: 
Colin alone:   100% of D 
Coalition Rose and Larry: 100% of AE 
Value of the game:  3 for Colin / -3 for Coalition 




Larry v. Rose and Colin 
Colin-C Colin-C Colin-D Colin-D
Rose-A Rose-B Rose-A Rose-B
A -2 2 1 -5
Larry     




Larry alone:   50% of E and 50% of F 
Coalition Rose and Colin: 33.33 % of AD and 66.66 of BD 
Value of the game:  3 for Larry / -3 for Coalition 
Division of payoffs:  [-3.833, 6.833, -3]  
 
It is possible to imply what coalition is likely to occur by comparing the results 
for all three possible coalitions. Larry would prefer to play in coalition with Rose. Colin 
would prefer to be with Rose, and Rose would prefer to be with Colin. When two players 
prefer to play with each other, a coalition is likely to occur. Therefore, for this game, the 
most likely coalition is Rose and Colin, as both players can receive their best outcome 
playing together. However, sometimes the players do not have a preference of another 
player, and so it is not possible to say what coalition is likely to form. 
Rose    alone              -4.25  
            with Colin      -3.83     Most preferred 
            with Larry      -4
----------------------------------------------------------
Colin   alone              3
            with Rose       6.83      Most preferred 
            with Larry      6
----------------------------------------------------------
Larry   alone              -3
            with Rose       1           Most preferred 




C.  SIDEPAYMENTS 
Larry is certainly not happy with the likely coalition between Rose and Colin. He 
tries to find a way to persuade Colin to play with him. If Larry would give Colin, for the 
sake of argument, one unit, Colin’s total payoff would then be seven, and he would have 
an incentive to play with Larry. Larry’s payoff in this case would be -2.75 (-1.75-1), 
which is still better than playing alone and ending up with -3. This idea is called 
sidepayment. 
Sidepayments are not possible in all games because it’s necessary for payoffs to 
be transferable. It is hard to transfer one’s good feelings or, for example, health. 
Generally, it is difficult to place a value on nonmaterial things. Also, payoffs have to be 
comparable. One unit of utility has to mean the same for both players. Fortunately, it is 
possible to express most games in the economic area in terms of money, with the caveat 
that sometimes the value of one dollar is not the same for all the players. 
A further difficulty with the sidepayments is that nothing can stop Rose from 
offering Colin 0.25 of unit and beat Colin’s offer.  The players then can place bids and 
counter bids in a circular manner. There is a whole field of game theory that deals with 
which coalition can form and how the payoffs should be divided among the players. 
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APPENDIX 1 – TOOLKIT MANUAL 
This manual, for the software toolkit included in the thesis, uses the following 
format. 
File name: Name of the file containing the template. 
Lpslink.dll: Yes/No – tells whether it is necessary to install lpslink.dll. It is an 
open source lpsolve solver using the simplex method. One can copy the file in user path 
or into C:\WINDOWS\system32. One can also double click on CopyLink.bat. It copies 
the dynamic library automatically into the appropriate space. 
Description: Brief description of the software tool and its purpose. 
Assumptions: Any necessary assumptions used in the model. 
Instructions: Instructions tell the user how and where to input the data, which 
and in what order to push the command buttons. 
Screenshots: Annotated screenshots facilitate understanding of the templates. 
Additional information for all parts of the toolkit: 
- Excel spreadsheets are protected against accidental damage. There is no 
password, so the templates and macros can be adjusted according to user needs. 
- The names of the players and their strategies can be changed; this change is then 
reflected in the answers for easier readability and understanding. 
- Macros have to be enabled in order to function properly. 
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 A. ZERO-SUM GAME: MAXIMIN & MINIMAX, SADDLE POINT 
File name: ZeroSum_MaxiMin_MiniMax_SaddlePoint.xls 
Lpslink.dll: No 
Description: Solver finds the MaxiMin strategies of the Row player and 
MiniMax strategies of the Column player. If the values are equal, it marks the 
intersection as Saddle point and writes it out. The color legend also tells whether the 
strategy is dominant or not. Graphs are helpful for visualization of the problem. 
Assumptions:  Row player is maximizing. Column player is minimizing. Row 
player’s payoffs. 
Instructions: Write the payoffs in the appropriate cells, starting from left upper 









B. ZERO-SUM GAME: TWO PLAYERS / TWO STRATEGIES 
File name: ZeroSum_2x2.xls 
Lpslink.dll: No 
Description: Solver finds a value of the game and optimal strategies of the 
players. It tells whether the solution is in pure strategy or mixed strategy.  Solver shows a 
movement diagram of the game and graphical solution. In the numerical part, it uses and 
shows both methods covered in the thesis (expected value method and method of 
oddments). The process of reaching the solution is intentionally detailed to help with the 
understanding of the problem. 
Assumptions: Row player is maximizing. Column player is minimizing. Row 
player’s payoffs. 










C. ZERO-SUM GAME: TWO PLAYERS / UP TO TEN STRATEGIES 
File name: ZeroSum_UpTo10x10.xls 
Lpslink.dll: Yes 
Description: Solver finds a value of the game and optimal strategies of the 
players. Solver calculates the results for each player separately. It allows for the 
comparison of the values of the game (should be equal) and checks whether it works 
properly. Solver also incorporates a graphical depiction of the game. Sometimes it offers 
interesting insights; sometimes it is just a mess. 
Assumptions: Row player is maximizing. Column player is minimizing. Row 
player’s payoffs. 
Instructions: Write the payoffs in the appropriate cells, starting from left upper 






optimal strategy  






D. PARTIAL-SUM GAME: PRUDENTIAL STRATEGIES 
File name: PartialSum_Prudential_SecurityLevels.xls 
Lpslink.dll: Yes 
Description: Solver finds prudential strategies of the players in the partial-sum 
game, when the opponent turns hostile. The value of the game, when prudential strategy 
is used, is the player’s security level. The solution is divided into two annotated sub-
games, where one player is maximizing, and the other is minimizing. The graph shows 
the payoff polygon and the security levels of the players. 
Assumptions: Rose’s prudential strategy – In Rose’s game (Rose’s payoffs), 
Rose is maximizing and Colin is minimizing. Colin’s prudential strategy – In Colin’s 
game (Colin’s payoffs), Colin is maximizing and Rose is minimizing. 
Instructions: Write the payoffs of the players in the MainPrud sheet and hit the 














E. PARTIAL-SUM GAME: EQUALIZING STRATEGIES AND NASH 
EQUILIBRIUMS 
File name: PartialSum_Equalizing_NashEquilibriums.xls 
Lpslink.dll: No 
Description: The solver finds the Nash Equilibriums and equalizing strategies of 
the players in the partial-sum game. The values of the game, when the players use 
equalizing strategy, form Nash Equilibrium in the mixed strategy. The solution is divided 
into two annotated sub-games, where one player is maximizing, and the other is 
equalizing. The graph shows the payoff polygon and Nash Equilibriums. 
Assumptions: Rose’s equalizing strategy – In Colin’s game (Colin’s payoffs), 
Colin is maximizing, and Rose is equalizing. Colin’s equalizing strategy – In Rose’s 
game (Rose’s payoffs), Rose is maximizing, and Colin is equalizing.  







F. PARTIAL-SUM GAME: NASH ARBITRATION 
File name: PartialSum_NashArbitration.xls 
Lpslink.dll: Yes 
Description: The solver solves the Nash arbitration and finds a Nash point. It 
solves a game from a Status Quo point. The solver provides a detailed graphical solution.  
A status quo, based on the security levels of the players, is built in. It is also possible to 
choose a different starting point. 
Assumptions: Both players are maximizing. Status Quo lies inside the payoff 
polygon. Fair solution maximizes (x-x0)*(y-y0). 
Instructions: Write payoffs of the players in the NashArbitrationSQ sheet. Set a 
status quo by pushing Solve Security levels SQ button or write the required status quo. 




Sheet – Solution1, solution in the pure strategy 
Solution1
A:C [1 , 0]
A:D [5 , 3.2]
B:C [3 , 4]
B:D [6 , 1]
SQ [3 , 2.06451612903226]
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Sheet – Solution2Step1, solution in the mixed strategy 
Solution2 Step1 
A:C [1 , 3]
A:D [4 , 2]
B:C [2 , 4]
B:D [3 , 1]
SQ [2 , 3]













NASH POINT       
(Xo+b/2|m|, Yo+ b/2) 
m...slope of the pareto 
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Sheet – Solution2Step2, solution in the mixed strategy 
Solution2 Step2 
A:D [ 4 , 2 ]











 Row has to play 75% of B 
and 25% of A
 Column has to play 25% of 
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G. PARTIAL-SUM GAME: STRATEGIC MOVES 
File name: PartialSum_StrategicMoves.xls 
Lpslink.dll: No 
Description: The solver analyzes the options available to the players. The Toolkit 
solves the first move, threat, promise, and their combinations. The solver finds whether a 
player has a strategic move, if the move works and whether the outcome is better than a 
likely outcome without communication. 
Assumptions: The solver assumes that the moves are credible and feasible. The 
solver assumes that player wants the opponent to play opposite strategy than the 
opponent’s strategy in likely outcome without communication. The likely outcome in this 
solver is determined as follows: (1) The solver checks for dominant strategies. If at least 
one player has a dominant strategy, the opponent chooses the better outcome for him and 
the combination is the likely outcome. If not, (2) the solver uses the intersection of 
MaxiMin strategies of the players. 
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Instructions: First, calculate the likely outcome (likely outcome button). Then, 
analyze the game (solve strategic moves button). If it’s desirable to have a different likely 
outcome, it is possible to write the payoffs and strategies in the appropriate place and hit 
solve strategic moves. In this case, it is necessary to write the resulting payoffs and 






Hint on where the outcome 
comes from
Likely outcome





H. 3 – PERSON: COALITIONS 
File name: 3Person.xls  
Lpslink.dll: Yes 
Description: The solver analyzes possible coalitions and which coalition is likely 
to form. The solver checks whether it is a constant sum-game and analyzes three possible 
coalitions. It tells the value of the game in the sub-games, optimal prudential strategies, 
and how the payoffs are divided among the members of the coalition. A summary of the 
payoffs for each option shows what the players would like to do.  Arrows can be used for 
determination of the Nash equilibrium. 
Assumptions: The game has to be either constant-sum or zero-sum. In the sub-
game player v. coalition, both sides play prudential strategy. The game is without 
sidepayments. 
Instructions: Write payoffs of the players in the Main3Person sheet and hit 
Solve button. 
Screenshots: 









I. LINEAR PROGRAMMING 
File name: LP_lpsolve_5Variables.xls and LP_lpsolve_10Variables.xls 
Lpslink.dll: Yes 
Description: This is a template for solving LP. The solver uses the open source 
lpsolve library for the solution (simplex method). By using this template, one does not 
have to worry about the proper structure of the input data required by lpsolve. 
Assumptions: The problem has to be bounded; otherwise, the software does not 
work (error code 3). 
Instructions: Always start from the left. First, write the coefficient of the 
objective function. Second, write whether the results should be integer (write 1) or real 
(write 0). Third, determine whether it is a maximizing or minimizing problem. Next, 








Solution Coefficients of the objective function
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APPENDIX 2 – HOW TO MAKE A CHART FOR A 2X2 ZERO-SUM 
GAME  
A Zero-Sum game between Rose and Colin with these payoffs will be considered.  
                     Colin
                     C    D    
A 5 2
Rose       
B 1 3
     
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
It is simple for one to make a graphical depiction of the game. It is necessary to 
create two graphs, one for each player. The following illustration begins with Rose. 
Step 1. Make a graph with the values on the x-axis 0 to 1 and on the y-axis large 
enough to accommodate the highest and lowest payoffs. In the graph on the x-axis, erect 
a perpendicular line intersecting the axis in the 0 and 1. These lines will represent Rose’s 
Pure strategies.  
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Step 2. Rose has options to play either strategy A, or strategy B, or some 
combination of these two strategies.  
If Rose would play only strategy A (pure Strategy) her payoffs would be 5 (Colin-
C) and 2 (Colin-D).Points [0, 5], [0, 2]. Place the values on the graph. 
The same can be done for Rose's strategy B. If Rose would play only strategy 2 
her payoffs would be 1(Colin-C) and 3 (Colin-D) Points [1, 1], [1, 3].  
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Step 3. Now connect points depicting the values of Colin's strategies. Colin Pure 
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The resulting graph depicts the game from Rose's point of view. 
The same process is used for creating the graph for Colin. 
Step 1. 
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The graphical depiction shows very clearly whether the game has saddle point. In 
the 2x2 zero-sum game, the game has the saddle point only when at least one player has a 
dominant strategy. In the graph, it is easy to see: the lines do not intersect each other on 
the open interval (0,1). 
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APPENDIX 3 – HOW TO CONVERT THE GAME INTO LINEAR 
PROGRAM  
For more complicated games, such as 3x3 and more, the best way is to convert the 
game and use linear programming (LP) solvers or the toolkit provided with this thesis. 
Otherwise, one would have to try all possible intersections of the expected values 




1         2
                    Colin
                  C        D    
A AC AD
Rose   
B BC BD




⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
In the linear program, there is the objective function and a set of constraints that 
limit our solution. Objective function in game theory is the value of the game, which is 
necessary to either maximize or minimize. For Rose (maximizing) it is: 
Objective function: 
Value of the game (v) Î maximize 






1.                   1    Probabilities has to be equal to 1
2.     ( )
3.     ( )
For       0
0    
0
p p
EV Colin C v
EV Colin D v
v
AC p BC p v








By changing:  p1, p2, v  
Constraints 2 and 3 are derived from the minimax theorem. All values of the 
game (possible solutions) have to be less than or equal to expected value of all of Colin’s 
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pure strategies. The feasible region is restricted from the above by Colin pure strategies. 
The value of the game determined by mixed strategy p1 and p2 has to be less or equal.  
For Colin (minimizing) the LP is: 
 Objective function: 
Value of the game (v) Î minimize 






1.                   1   
2.      ( - )
3.      ( - )
For       0
0    
0
q q
EV Rose A v
EV Rose B v
v
AC q AD q v








By changing:  p1, p2, v  
This time the candidate solutions have to be higher than or equal to the expected 
value of all of Rose’s pure strategies. The feasible region is restricted from below. 
We have created the LP in general; the exact procedure for solver set up differs 
from solver to solver. For example in the Excel solver or the LP solve solver used in the 
toolkit, it is not possible to define the objective function just as one variable. This 
limitation can be overcome by adjusting the objective function. 
Example: p1+ p2+v Î maximize 
By adjusting the objective function this way, the solver readily solves the 
problem. We only have to keep in mind that the result has to be subtracted by p1+ p2=1 in 
order to get the value of the game.  
The Excel solver also uses the approximation method, so be aware of possible 
errors in the results. 
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